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Job search theory offers a framework to explain the duration of
unemployment spells. In this framework, unemployedworkers search
sequentially for a job. If job offers arrive at random and the
distribution of offers is known, it is optimal for the searcher to accept
the ﬁrst offer which is at or above the reservation wage. This strategy
balances search costs and expected gains from further search.
Knowing or learning about the distribution of wage offers is a non-
trivial task for job-seekers. While the job searcher is learning over
time – updating prior beliefs with recently sampled job offers – the
choice of an initial prior is important.1 A job searcher may use his orher past wage as a prior for the wage offer distribution. If the past
wage equals the worker's productivity, it will be a perfect starting
point. If, however, the wage was greater than the worker's
productivity, e.g., because of seniority wages, this may result in an
overly high reservation wage due to a distorted perception of the
worker's productivity. In consequence, the overly high reservation
wage will result in the rejection of wage offers the worker would have
accepted had the reservation wage been based on the correct wage
distribution. Empirically, this will translate into relatively longer
unemployment durations, which are being determined by how
quickly the searcher updates his or her prior of the wage offer
distribution.2
We study workers who exogenously lost their jobs due to plant
closures and analyze their unemployment durations. A random
sample of unemployed workers would be problematic for two
reasons: workers dismissed for a cause might be negatively selected
and, more importantly, workers who quit their job voluntarily
typically do so because they are looking for a better(-paid) job.
These workers will bias the analysis. Using unemployed workers from
plant closures solves this problem, because plant closures hit all
workers alike.1998) studies the relation between the wage distribution in the
ployment durations and ﬁnds that average wages have no
employment durations, while other parameters of the wage
quality in the old ﬁrm, do.
779R. Böheim et al. / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 778–785Because wagesmay contain components which are not related to a
worker's productivity, such as rents, seniority pay or efﬁciency wage
components, we decompose past wages into worker-speciﬁc, human-
capital speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc components. The decomposition
separates wage components which reﬂect a worker's productivity,
including unobservable productivity components (ﬁxed effects), from
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc part of the wage. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc component is
normalized to reﬂect deviations from the industry average. Our data
cover all Austrian workers for more than three decades, which allows
us to reliably decompose the last wage before the plant closures and
to study the unemployed workers' subsequent labor market spells.
Using the same decomposition procedure, Gruetter and Lalive (2009)
show that ﬁrm ﬁxed effects indeed play an important role in the wage
determination in Austria. Their estimates suggest that around 27% of
total variation in wages can be explained by unobserved ﬁrm effects.
These considerations are related to recent discussions in
behavioral economics about overconﬁdence (Della Vigna, 2007).
Workers who judge their productivity correctly will base their
expectations of the wage offer distribution only on those parts of the
wage which reﬂect their productivity. Overconﬁdent workers might
mistake (parts of) the ﬁrm component for their own productivity
and attribute the ﬁrm component to their own effort and ability.
While there is ﬁeld evidence on overconﬁdence in e.g., trading
patterns of individuals (Barber and Odean, 2001) or in CEO behavior
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005), there is little direct evidence on labor
market or search behavior. Hoch (1985) found that MBA students
overestimate the number of job offers they will receive and the
magnitude of their salary.3 Explicitly considering the role of
behavioral aspects in search processes, Falk et al. (2006) show in a
laboratory experiment that people are substantially uncertain about
their own abilities and that this misperception of relative abilities
affects search outcomes. While some high ability people do not
search enough, some low ability people search too much. This idea is
related to the notion of loss aversion in ﬁnance, where people are
reluctant to sell a stock once its price goes below the price the
investor has paid before (Kahneman et al., 1991): here workers
might be reluctant to sell their human capital for a price below the
previously acknowledged value.
Our analysis is also relevant for the discussion of the employment
patterns of older workers. For example, Saint-Paul (2009) argues that
Continental European labor markets are rigid, especially because of
age- and tenure-related wage schedules, and in addition to earnings-
related (Bismarckian) welfare state beneﬁts, older workers might
easily become too expensive, given their productivity. If older workers
receive wages that are in excess of their productivity due to seniority-
based wages and they mistakenly assume that such wages reﬂect
their true productivity, they will have reservation wages that are too
high and end up with long unemployment durations. Our analysis can
shed some light on this discussion.
We ﬁnd that only young workers can be described as over-
conﬁdent. Workers who previously had a high ﬁrm-ﬁxed component
tend to search longer for a new job than those who had a low ﬁrm
component. They presumably expect to ﬁnd high-paying jobs and
turn downmore realistic job offers at the start of their unemployment
spells. We explore that the pattern might be caused by misconcep-
tions of the true wage distribution, e.g., because workers have not
been actively searching for new employment in the past. Our analyses
along such lines suggest that overconﬁdence is the more probable
explanation for the relatively longer unemployment durations of
workers who had high ﬁrm components. In addition, we do not ﬁnd
evidence that older workers remain unemployed because they
systematically misjudge potential wages, given their productivity.3 Dubra (2004) assumes in a theoretical model that searchers are overconﬁdent and
explores search behavior and corresponding welfare effects. There is also a larger
experimental literature on bargaining behavior, e.g., Babcock and Loewenstein (1997).2. Empirical strategy
We model unemployment durations with proportional discrete
time hazard rate models. The reservation wage, ξ, is the minimum
acceptable wage offer which results from equating expected gains
from continued searchwith the expected value from accepting a wage
offer. In a simple search model (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983), it is
given by:
ξ = b +
λ
ρ
∫∞ξ 1−F ξð Þdw;ð
where 1−F(ξ) is the probability that the wage offer w is greater than
the reservation wage. b denotes the value of the outside option and λ
is the probability of a wage offer. Future incomes are discounted with
a factor ρ. The hazard rate from unemployment, h, is given by the
product of two probabilities, the probability of receiving an offer, λ,
and the probability that the offer is acceptable, 1−F(ξ): h=λ[1−F
(ξ)]. Thus the workers' belief of the true wage offer distribution is
directly linked to the hazard of leaving unemployment: if workers
believe that the wage distribution is to the right of the actual wage
distribution, they will reject wage offers as unacceptable and remain
unemployed longer. The reverse is true for workers who think that the
wage offer distribution is to the left of the actual wage offer
distribution, they will leave unemployment earlier. We argue that
such distortionsmay arise fromwage components that do not reﬂect a
worker's productivity, but may be caused by ﬁrm ﬁxed wage
components.
We use the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model, augmented with
a discrete mixture distribution to account for unobserved individual
heterogeneity, as proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984).4
Suppose there are i=1,…,Nworkers who become unemployed at
time t=0 and are observed for s time periods. At each point in time,
the worker either remains unemployed or ﬁnds new employment.
The discrete hazard rate in period t is (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978):
ht = 1− exp − exp β0 + Xitβð Þð Þ; ð1Þ
where β0 is an intercept and the linear index function, Xitβ,
incorporates the impact of the covariates. (See also Jenkins (1995).)
Workers who leave the sample for other reasons, e.g., retiring, are
treated as censored.
Suppose that each worker belongs to a group of an unobserved
type, e.g., low or high ability in obtaining a job. This can be
parameterized by allowing the intercept term β0 to differ across
types (Heckman and Singer, 1984). In a model with types z=1,…,Z,
the hazard function for worker belonging to type z is:
hz;t = 1− exp − exp mz + β0 + Xitβð Þð Þ; ð2Þ
and the probability of belonging to type z is pz. The mz are the mass
points of a multinomial distribution where m1 is normalized to equal
zero and p1=1−∑ z=2z= Zpz. The z-th mass point equals mz+β0.
This econometric speciﬁcation allows for time-varying covariates
and to investigate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for
leaving unemployment. The vector of characteristics, Xit, includes
time-invariant characteristics, e.g., the ﬁrm size at the start of the
unemployment spell, and time-varying characteristics, such as e.g.,
the beneﬁt replacement rate of the unemployed. In addition to these
(standard) controls, we also control for whether the worker enjoyed
above-average ﬁrm components or not, estimated from a decompo-
sition of the wages. We expect that workers who had received above-
average ﬁrm-ﬁxed components will remain unemployed longer, all
other things equal. The indicator of the ﬁrm-ﬁxed component is by
construction orthogonal to the person-speciﬁc wage component and4 We use Jenkins' (2004) Stata module to estimate the hazard models.
780 R. Böheim et al. / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 778–785should therefore capture such an effect of a distorted perception of the
wage offer distribution on the unemployment duration.53. Data
We use linked employer–employee data from the Austrian Social
Security Database (ASSD) which contains detailed information on all
workers covered by the Austrian social security system from 1972 to
2009.6 Because of strong seasonality in employment (Del Bono and
Weber, 2008), we exclude construction and tourismworkers. We also
limit our sample to workers with a minimum tenure of six weeks in
the last ﬁrm.
Typically, a sample of job searchers is composed of workers who
were ﬁred in their old job due to inadequate performance, workers
who were ﬁred due to labor demand volatility and workers who quit
voluntarily. Both workers ﬁred for cause and those quitting
voluntarily pose a problem for an analysis of wage expectations,
because their separation from the ﬁrm is an endogenous event. We
therefore concentrate onworkers from plant closures where the cause
of unemployment is an exogenous event. Our sample consists of
workers who were laid off due to plant closures between 1990 and
1996 and who were between 20 and 55 (50 for females) years of age
at that time.
Plant closures are not directly observed in the data, but identiﬁed
indirectly by the disappearance of a ﬁrm's identiﬁer. To ensure these
disappearances are true plant closures, and not merely caused by e.g.,
administrative recoding, we deﬁne ﬁrms as closing ﬁrms only if one of
the following requirements is fulﬁlled. First, the majority of workers is
not immediately employed after the disappearance of the identiﬁer,
(2) the majority of workers is employed in a single ﬁrm with a
different identiﬁer, but the workers account for less than 50% of the
new ﬁrm's workforce, or (3) the majority of workers is spread out
over different ﬁrms.
In total, we observe 28,078 female and 37,432 male workers being
laid off from 31,704 closing ﬁrmswithin 60 days before plant closure.7
From these, we exclude workers for whom we cannot decompose the
wages, which reduces our estimating sample to 24,424 female and
34,746 male workers in 30,192 closing ﬁrms.8 The unemployment
duration is the number of days starting from the day theworker is laid
off until the worker starts a new job. Unemployment spells that last
longer than 1500 days are censored. Spells that end with death, self
employment, maternity leave, or subsidized employment and sick
leave lasting for more than 6 months are also censored.3.1. Decomposition of wages
Following Gruetter and Lalive (2009) we derive our proxy for the
distortion of the reservation wage by decomposing wages into
worker-speciﬁc, human-capital speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc compo-
nents. For this we use the universe of all blue-collar workers for the
years 1980 to 2000 and not only our sample of workers who worked
in ﬁrms that closed down. These are 3,818,508 workers in 459,144
ﬁrms after deleting observations where we cannot identify the wage
components.5 Hogan (2004) uses an estimate of the wage offer distribution in a duration model
to investigate the relationship between the reservation wage and unemployment
durations. However, this strategy requires information on expected wages which are
not available in our data.
6 See Zweimüller et al. (2009) for a description of the data.
7 To check for robustness, we follow Schwerdt (2011) and also sample early leavers:
workers who were laid off up to 180 days before plant closure. See below.
8 Notice that ﬁrm-ﬁxed components in the wages are only identiﬁed if we observe
at least one worker moving in or out of a ﬁrm. Similarly, worker-ﬁxed components are
only identiﬁed for workers who are observed in at least two different ﬁrms.The wages are decomposed following Abowd et al. (1999):
yijt|{z}
log wageð Þ
= ϕj|{z}
firm‐fixed component
+ θi|{z}
person‐fixed component
+ X′ijtβ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
returns to productivity
+εijt ;
ð3Þ
where
E it jθi;ϕj; t;Xijt
h i
= 0: ð4Þ
The parameter ϕj in Eq. (3) gives the difference in earnings in ﬁrm
j=1,…, J, relative to the average ﬁrm. This is our indicator of ﬁrm-ﬁxed
components as it indicates a relatively low or high wage in the past job,
controlling for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity. The
parameter θi captures all (unobserved) time-invariant differences
betweenworkers andmay be seen as a proxy for ability. The parameter
vectorβ captures economywide returns to productivity and experience
for the time-varying characteristics of worker i in ﬁrm j at time t, Xijt.9
It is important to stress that the identifying assumption behind
Eq. (4) requires the error term to be independent of any observable
effects in Xijt, the person-ﬁxed component θi or the ﬁrm-ﬁxed
component ϕj. In other words, it assumes exogenous mobility,
which might be a strong assumption. If there is positive assortative
matching, i.e., good ﬁrms employ good workers, then the correlation
between θi and ϕj should be positive (and large).10 Here, in contrast,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed components are weakly negatively
correlated, the correlations are−0.01 for male and−0.006 for female
workers. However, Abowd et al. (2004) caution that the mere
examination of the correlation between person and ﬁrm components
is not sufﬁcient to provide evidence for or against sorting in the labor
market. We therefore follow De Melo (2008) and additionally
calculate the correlation between a worker's ﬁxed component, θi,
and the mean of the co-workers' ﬁxed components, θ−i. This
correlation is small, corr θi; θ−i
 
= 0:095, and indicates that there is
little sorting in our data.11 Unobserved heterogeneity of the workers
may not be considered a problem–it is captured by the worker ﬁxed
effect–as far as we can safely assume that this ﬁxed effect is time-
invariant.
We normalize the ﬁrm-ﬁxed component to reﬂect deviations from
the industry average and we characterize workers by whether they
worked in ﬁrms that paid above the average (“high-wage ﬁrms”) and
those that paid below the average (“low-wage ﬁrms”):
I ϕj
 
=
1 if ϕj N 0
0 if ϕj ≤ 0
;

ð5Þ
and we re-write Eq. (2) as
hz;t = 1− exp − exp mz + β0 + Xitβ + I ϕj
   
: ð6Þ
Although post-unemployed wages were on average higher for
workers with previously high ﬁrm-ﬁxed components than for those
with low ﬁrm components, we see that workers from “high wage
ﬁrms” experienced a relative wage loss and those from “low wage
ﬁrms” a relative wage gain. Workers from “high wage ﬁrms” were
slightly older than workers coming from “low wage ﬁrms”, and they
had on average shorter tenures.9 We use Ouazad's (2008) Stata module. Standard errors are obtained via
bootstrapping. Detailed estimation results are shown in the appendix.
10 Shimer (2005) shows that a model with coordination frictions may lead to positive
but imperfect correlation between workers' productivity and ﬁrms' types. Abowd et al.
(2004), in a simulation of Shimer's (2005) results, obtain a negative correlation
between person and ﬁrm components.
11 We bootstrap the correlation using 50 replications.
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Fig. 2. Relative change in ﬁrm-ﬁxed components before and after plant closure by level
of pre-displacement ﬁrm component.
781R. Böheim et al. / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 778–785If our decomposition of wages is valid, ﬁrm-ﬁxed wage compo-
nents are random and workers who worked in ﬁrms with high ﬁrm
wage components should lose the ﬁrm component, and vice versa.
This is, in fact, what we ﬁnd. For bothmales and females, workers who
worked in low-wage ﬁrms have on average higher wages in their new
jobs, and workers from high-wage ﬁrms have lower wages in their
new jobs. Fig. 1 looks at this pattern in more detail. For each elapsed
unemployment duration, we plot the average wage change between
the old and new job, distinguishing between workers who earlier had
worked in low-wage or high-wage ﬁrms. Workers who had enjoyed
positive ﬁrm-ﬁxed components in the past clearly have lower wages
in their new jobs, independent of elapsed unemployment duration. In
contrast, workers who had worked in low-wage ﬁrms experience
wage increases at shorter unemployment durations. For longer
unemployment durations, they also experience a wage loss, however,
this is less pronounced than for workers who had worked in high-
wage ﬁrms.12 Overall, workers who remain unemployed longer than
about 20 weeks face a negative trend in wages, which is probably a
combination of selection and stigma effects.
Fig. 2 indicates that the convergence inwages is, in fact, driven by a
convergence in ﬁrm-ﬁxed components. We see large increases in ﬁrm
components – up to 25% – for workers who had worked in low-wage
ﬁrms and losses of about 10% for those from high-wage ﬁrms. These
patterns are conﬁrming once more the validity of the wage
decomposition procedure. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.4. Results
We present results from non-parametric discrete-time hazard rate
models, estimated separately for men and women, in Table 2. The
explanatory variables in all speciﬁcations include the replacement
rate, the worker's age at the time of plant closure, the (old) ﬁrm's size
at the time of plant closure, and indicator variables for year, industry
and region. The speciﬁcation presented in columns (1) and (4) does
not contain the wage components and serves as a benchmark for our
speciﬁcations below. The estimates indicate that the higher the
replacement rate, the lower the hazard of ﬁnding employment, a
ﬁnding that is consistent with previous research on unemployment
durations (e.g., Meyer, 1990).13 Older workers search somewhat
longer than younger workers.−
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Fig. 1. Relative change in wages before and after plant closure by level of pre-
displacement ﬁrm wage component.
12 Due to smaller sample sizes at longer unemployment durations, the conﬁdence
intervals are large at durations longer than 30 weeks.
13 See Lalive et al. (2006) for an analysis concerning different ﬁnancial incentives in
the Austrian context.The speciﬁcation in columns (2) and (5) augments the benchmark
speciﬁcation with the estimated ﬁrm- and person-ﬁxed wage
components which are introduced as dummy variables indicating
below or above average values.14 Workers who had high ﬁrm
components in their previous employment have lower hazard rates,
indicating that they search longer than comparable workers who had
low ﬁrm components. The result holds both for men and women;
however, for women, the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. The resulting longer unemployment durations for
workers from high-wage ﬁrms are compatible with our hypothesis
that these workers base their wage expectations not only on their
person-speciﬁc component, but also on the ﬁrm component.
These workers could be characterized as being overconﬁdent of
their own abilities and productivity. In other words, they appear to
attribute the wage they earned in the past ﬁrm largely towards their
own capabilities and disregard the randomness which might have
played a role in the ﬁrm-ﬁxed wage component they enjoyed in theTable 1
Descriptive statistics by gender and ﬁrm component category.
Male Female
Low[a] High[a] Low[a] High[a]
Daily wage old job 40.8 55.0[b] 25.9 35.4[b]
(12.8) (14.4) (8.9) (11.4)
Unemployment duration 117 128[b] 126 123[b]
(128) (130) (134) (115)
Daily wage new job 41.1 49.1[b] 28.8 32.8
(14.5) (15.0) (10.8) (12.1)
Age 33.6 34.7[b] 32.5 32.7
(9.7) (10.1) (8.8) (9.1)
Tenure (days) 1308 1267 1226 1219
(1820) (1822) (1563) (1610)
Workers with high person effect (%) 52.5 55.4 38.2 30.2
% of workers 54.6 45.4 70.9 29.1[b]
Notes: Means (standard deviations in parentheses). Wages are deﬂated to prices of
1990. [a] “Low” and “high” indicate below and above average ﬁrm-ﬁxed components
respectively. [b] Difference between “low” and “high” statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
14 Robustness tests when we change the cutoff to median values or to the top 25% or
introduce ﬁrm rents as a continuous variable are available on request: they are
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
Table 2
Estimated hazard rates from unemployment to employment, by gender.
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High ﬁrm component (0/1) −0.057*** −0.054** – −0.024 −0.055*
– (0.022) (0.027) – (0.025) (0.030)
High person component (0/1) – 0.184*** 0.217*** – 0.099*** 0.098***
– (0.017) (0.022) – (0.024) (0.029)
Replacement rate −0.032*** −0.024*** −0.032*** −0.031*** −0.025*** −0.031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.015*** −0.013*** −0.013*** −0.008*** −0.005*** −0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Mass point 1.334*** – 1.329*** 1.244*** – 1.247***
(0.028) – (0.028) (0.049) – (0.049)
P(mass point) 0.647 – 0.659 0.724 – 0.729
0.0181 – 0.0182 0.0487 – 0.0494
Obs. 16,574 16,574 16,574 10,448 10,448 10,448
Notes: Discrete-time proportional hazard rate models. Additional variables are log(ﬁrm size), 5 year, 9 region and 15 industry dummy variables. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at
the 1, 5 and 10% level.
782 R. Böheim et al. / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 778–785last ﬁrm. In addition, we ﬁnd that individuals with high person-
speciﬁc components leave unemployment earlier, in particular men.
This variable is a proxy for ﬁxed personal traits, such as ability,
productivity or work effort, and the positive association with the
hazard rate is therefore to be expected.
The speciﬁcation in columns (3) and (6) additionally controls for
unobserved heterogeneity in the search process by estimating two
mass points for the distribution of abilities.15 In addition to
heterogeneity captured by the ﬁxed person effects, which indicate
differences in unobserved productivity, the mass points control for
unspeciﬁc differences in job ﬁnding (and accepting) probabilities. It
turns out that the inclusion of mass points does not change our
estimated coefﬁcients to a large extent. The only exception is the
coefﬁcient for the high ﬁrm component for females, which is now
more precisely estimated. Interestingly, the estimates imply only
minor differences for male and female workers, and especially the
associations between high ﬁrm components and the hazard rate are
virtually identical.16 The estimated coefﬁcient of −0.054 for male
workers translates into a 1 percentage point lower hazard rate. This
implies that after six months the probability of being unemployed is
almost 3pp higher for those workers who enjoyed above average
ﬁrm-ﬁxed components prior to unemployment.174.1. Age differences
Results from the psychological literature suggest that older adults
have greater insight into the limitations of their knowledge than
younger ones (Pliske and Mutter, 1996; Musiélak et al., 2006); in
other words, overconﬁdence might be related to age and the
associated differences in postformal cognitive development (Pliske
and Mutter, 1996).
We split our population into young, prime-age and old workers.
The results are tabulated in Table 3 using the comprehensive15 When we include more than two mass points, all additional mass points are not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
16 To assess the consequences of missing information on hours worked in the female
estimations we ran the following check: We replaced the ﬁrm-ﬁxed wage component
in the hazard rate estimations for females with ﬁrm-ﬁxed components that were
calculated from a male worker sample. Since part time work is negligible for male
workers the calculation of ﬁrm components in a male-only sample is not affected by
missing information of hours worked. Our results are robust to this procedure.
17 We calculate the survival rate for a representative person with mean character-
istics (mean age, tenure, replacement rate) for a person with and one without high
ﬁrm-ﬁxed components. This results in a hazard rate of 0.20 and 0.21 for workers with
low and high ﬁrm-ﬁxed components.speciﬁcation with mass points. While all other coefﬁcients–in
particular the person ﬁxed effect and the beneﬁt replacement rate–
have almost exactly the same inﬂuence across age groups, the effect of
the ﬁrm-ﬁxed component differs across age groups. Only for workers
below the age of 30 we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant effect of high
ﬁrm component on the hazard of leaving unemployment. This is
consistent with other patterns of overconﬁdence by young people as
know e.g., from trafﬁc accidents.18 Repeating the exercise from above
we ﬁnd that young male workers with high ﬁrm-ﬁxed components
experience an almost 3pp lower hazard rate translating into a 5pp
higher probability of being unemployed after 6 months.
More importantly perhaps, we do not see any evidence for
distorted wage expectations for prime-age workers and, in particular,
for older workers. It seems that these workers do not have excessive
wage expectations which were caused by ﬁrm components; Saint-
Paul's Saint-Paul (2009) argument for the unemployability of older
workers due to misguided reservation wages is not supported by our
evidence.
4.2. Overconﬁdent or inexperienced?
In our interpretations above we stressed overconﬁdence, i.e.,
attributing spurious wage components to one's own ability or effort,
as the cause for the differences in unemployment durations. However,
our empirical results could also be driven by systematic errors in
deriving the reservation wages, for example, because workers with
long tenures are less informed about the state of the labormarket than
workers who have short tenures. Workers with long tenures may
have inferior knowledge of the relevant wage offer distribution and
might therefore put too much emphasis on past wages. Alternatively,
workers who are new in a ﬁrm might have a better understanding of
the outside opportunities, which they faced when they searched for
the current job, and might therefore have less distorted views about
the wage offer distribution and their own productivity. To investigate
this issue, we separate our sample into workers with short and long
tenures in the previous ﬁrm.19 A tenure is short if it lasted up to 500
days.
The results are tabulated in Table 5. For males, we do not see any
difference between short- and long-tenured workers. Young workers
do search longer if they came from a high-wage ﬁrm, regardless of18 Young drivers' higher probability of being involved in car accidents is found to be
linked to young drivers being overconﬁdent in their own driving abilities. See e.g.,
Brown (1982) and Rumar (1985).
19 Due to small sample sizes, we pool prime age and older workers.
Table 3
Estimated hazard rates from unemployment to employment, by gender and age group.
Male workers Female workers
20–30 30–45 45+ 20–30 30–45 45+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High ﬁrm component (0/1) −0.145*** 0.016 0.007 −0.103** −0.028 0.063
(0.042) (0.041) (0.074) (0.048) (0.045) (0.083)
High person component (0/1) 0.202*** 0.257*** 0.263*** 0.152*** 0.028 0.202**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.059) (0.042) (0.045) (0.087)
Replacement rate −0.032*** −0.032*** −0.033*** −0.033*** −0.029*** −0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age 0.004 −0.001 −0.107*** −0.034*** 0.005 −0.080***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.020)
Mass point 1.233*** 1.287*** 1.471*** 1.375*** 1.077*** 1.010***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.078) (0.066) (0.084) (0.145)
P(mass point) 0.669 0.697 0.538 0.714 0.738 0.609
0.0301 0.0294 0.0541 0.0347 0.0576 0.189
Obs. 6785 6994 2795 4460 4609 1379
Notes: Discrete-time proportional hazard rate models corresponding to columns (2) and (5) in Table 2. Additional variables as in Table 2. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5
and 10% level.
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with respect to low-wage or high-wage ﬁrms. This is strong evidence
against the misconception argument. For females, the results are
similar: while we do ﬁnd ﬁrm-ﬁxed component effects for young
short-tenured workers, the effect is smaller and insigniﬁcant for
femaleswith a longer job tenure in the past. If long tenures had caused
the misconception, we would have expected the opposite result.
Again, there is no effect for prime-age or old women.
A similar test concerns the number of previous jobs, where
workers who were more exposed to realized rather than offered
wages might have a more realistic perception of the wage offer
distribution. We proxy this exposure by the number of previous jobs
and deﬁne a worker who had 5 or more previous jobs as a “job
hopper” and one with fewer than 5 previous jobs as a “stayer”. The
lower panel in Table 5 reports the estimated coefﬁcients for these
groups of workers, interacted with age. Again, we obtain large
negative coefﬁcients for young male workers, regardless whether
they were stayers or hoppers, indicating that high ﬁrm components
have a distortive effect on their wage expectations. While the
coefﬁcient for stayers is somewhat higher as compared to hoppers,
the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. For females, the results
are similar; both young job hoppers as well as stayers face longer
unemployment durations in case of higher previous ﬁrm ﬁxedTable 4
Estimated hazard rates from unemployment to employment, including early leavers.
Male workers
20–30 30–45
(1) (2)
High ﬁrm component (0/1) −0.109*** 0.002
(0.032) (0.030)
High person component (0/1) 0.226*** 0.222***
(0.029) (0.026)
Replacement rate −0.033*** −0.032***
(0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.020*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
Mass point 1.321*** 1.403***
(0.034) (0.036)
P(mass point) 0.633 0.733
(0.0216) (0.0189)
Obs. 10,125 11,152
Notes: Discrete-time proportional hazard rate models corresponding to columns (2) and (5)
and 10% level.components—but the effect for stayers is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Overall these tests imply that our results are not driven by young
workers' lack of job search experience.
It might be argued that Bayesian updating might explain our
results as well: Workers who become unemployed need to learn the
distribution of wage offers. Workers who previously earned high
wages may form a different prior relative to workers who earned low
wages and will have to update their beliefs more often before they
achieve a realistic belief of the wage offer distribution. Our
decomposition of wages into a ﬁrm-speciﬁc and individual-speciﬁc
part speaks against this hypothesis: A high ﬁrm wage component
prolongs unemployment durations, but a high individual-speciﬁc part
reduces unemployment durations. Workers do not appear to form a
simple prior of the wage distribution where they relate previous
wages to potential offers. (However, it might be possible that workers
are using a Bayesian updating strategy, if only for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
wage component.)
A further alternative explanation is liquidity constraints. Card et al.
(2007) show that workers search longer if they receive cash-on-hand
on becoming unemployed, e.g., from severance pay. Severance pay in
Austria is awarded according to tenurewith the ﬁrm. In Table 5we see
that the effect of high ﬁrm-speciﬁc components is fairly similar for
workers who had short or long tenure. We therefore believe thatFemale workers
45+ 20–30 30–45 45+
(3) (4) (5) (6)
−0.040 −0.112* 0.012 −0.059
(0.050) (0.066) (0.039) (0.046)
0.213*** 0.130*** −0.016 0.065
(0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.079)
−0.033*** −0.035*** −0.030*** −0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
−0.109*** −0.025*** −0.001 −0.077***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.017)
1.538*** 1.460*** 1.244*** 1.054***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.055) (0.128)
0.597 0.666 0.712 0.686
(0.0364) (0.0312) (0.0343) (0.109)
5038 5208 6192 1963
in Table 2. Additional variables as in Table 2. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5
Table 5
Estimated effect of high ﬁrm-ﬁxed component (0/1) on the hazard rates from
unemployment to employment for male and female workers, by pre-displacement
tenure and number of pre-displacement jobs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female
Young Prime age/old Young Prime age/old
Short tenurea −0.146*** −0.018 −0.128*** 0.054
(0.051) (0.049) (0.062) (0.059)
Long tenureb −0.167*** 0.038 −0.051 −0.050
(0.075) (0.053) (0.075) (0.052)
Hopper2 −0.136*** 0.029 −0.093* −0.005
(0.053) (0.042) (0.053) (0.044)
Stayer2 −0.173*** −0.106 −0.123 −0.066
(0.072) (0.069) (0.104) (0.088)
Notes: Discrete-time proportional hazard rate models corresponding to column (3) in
Table 2. Only the coefﬁcients for high ﬁrm-ﬁxed components are reported, additional
variables as in Table 2 (Abowd et al., 1999). A tenure is short if it was shorter or equal to
500 days (Abowdet al., 2004).Workerswith less/more than4 different previous jobs are
deﬁned as stayers/hoppers. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. a
and b indicate the copy editor included the ﬁrst 2 references (Abowd et al.) instead.
784 R. Böheim et al. / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 778–785liquidity constraints do not explain the longer unemployment
durations of workers who earned high ﬁrm speciﬁc wage
components.
4.3. Are plant closures random (enough)?
Because we use workers who are remaining with the ﬁrm until the
very end of the ﬁrm, we may have a selected sample of workers who
have below average characteristics of the unemployed. (“Good”
workers may have had other opportunities and left prior to the ﬁrm's
closing-down.) This aspect has been studied with similar Austrian
data by Schwerdt (2011), who suggests that an analysis that uses
plant closures to obtain an unbiased sample of the unemployed
should experiment with different sampling periods prior to plant
closure.
We therefore repeat the analysis including all employees who
have been laid off from the ﬁrm within six months before plant
closure. Extending the sampling period from two to six months
increases out sample size to 26,315 male and 13,363 female workers
experiencing at least one day of unemployment after lay-off.
Table 4 shows that our results are remarkably stable and, again,
young males and females have signiﬁcant longer unemployment
durations if they had high ﬁrm-ﬁxed components. The coefﬁcients are
similar in size to the ones in Table 3. It is therefore unlikely that our
result of a negative impact of high ﬁrm components on unemploy-
ment durations for younger workers is caused byworkers who left the
plants early.
5. Conclusion
Assessing one's own productivity is important for job search and
matching in the labor market. A realistic perception of one's
productivity will enable the job searcher to match efﬁciently with
an employer. According to psychological research, workers often
attribute (excessively) highwages to their own abilities rather than to
pure luck in obtaining employment with a ﬁrm that pays high ﬁrm-
speciﬁc wage components. Such unrealistic assessment could result in
a systematic misjudgment of the wage offer distribution that a job
searcher faces and might lead to a distorted job search process.
We study job search behavior of workers who were made
redundant due to plant closures in Austria and ﬁnd that only young
workers can be characterized as being overconﬁdent: high ﬁrm-
ﬁxed components in the last job lead to signiﬁcantly longer
unemployment durations. We do not ﬁnd such a pattern for
prime-age or older workers. These results challenge the view thatthe high unemployment rates of older workers in Europe are due to
excessive wage claims, which in turn are caused by a slow
adaptation to changing circumstances.
Several areas of scientiﬁc research have pointed to overconﬁdence
as a source of costs: Finance (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), Medicine
(Berner and Graber, 2008), and even sports (McGraw et al., 2004).
McGraw et al. (2004) show that people can increase their utility by
reducing their overconﬁdence. In particular, they demonstrate that
simply providing additional information increases utility by lowering
conﬁdence without negative effects on performance. Such additional
information could easily be provided by job centers, for example,
starting wage distributions by elapsed unemployment durations or by
previouswages. However, accurate informationmight not be the single
solution to overconﬁdence. Another, more costly approach might be to
provide feedback on wage expectations, e.g., a web based service
provided by job centers. However, Eberlein et al. (2005) caution that
some people ignore feedback more or less completely, while others
become confused. In any case, a large scale implementation of such
services requires careful testing and additional research.References
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